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I. INTRODUCTION
Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University 1 (GRC) exemplifies a rare
breed of judicial opinion: one that has become a proverbial canary in a coal mine.
It presaged what is emerging as the dominant question related to state regulation
of sexuality for the next decade: the tension between lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) equality claims and claims to religious liberty.
In GRC, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled both that a Roman Catholic
university had to provide equal material benefits to gay student organizations, and
that those organizations could be required to declare on stationery and in
publications that the university did not endorse their activities. By doing so, the
court granted victory to Georgetown University on expressive grounds and to the
Gay Rights Coalition on equality grounds. In the end, both parties claimed
victory. 2
It is tempting to attribute this Solomonic and seemingly happy ending to
the court’s deft accommodation of the two worldviews represented in the case.
The decision exemplifies reliance on pluralism as the central lodestar for
∗
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navigating factionalism in the modern democratic state. The court built its
resolution on an amicus brief from a Wisconsin civil rights agency that had
suggested the specific compromise, 3 adding an elaborate doctrinal path to reach
its result. The decision has become something of a poster child for judicial
minimalism: a model of wisdom, pragmatism, and statesmanship. 4
The opinion in GRC was the first by a court of last resort to establish
parameters for accommodating religious belief in the context of enforcing civil
rights protections for gay plaintiffs. It will not, however, be the last. Today the
volume of sexual orientation equality claims has dramatically increased. When
the complaint in the Georgetown case was filed in 1979, the District of Columbia
was the only state-level jurisdiction that prohibited anti-gay discrimination. 5
When the case was decided nine years later, only Wisconsin had joined D.C. in
banning sexual orientation discrimination. 6 Today, antidiscrimination laws in
twenty one states plus the District of Columbia contain this prohibition.7
Since GRC was decided, additional cases have arisen testing the
accommodation of religious beliefs in the context of gay rights claims. 8 In a case
3
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in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari, a New Mexico retail photographic
services business was found in violation of that state’s antidiscrimination law
after its refusal to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony. 9 In a different
context, the Court has found that a for-profit business can assert a religious liberty
claim. 10 Several disputes related to employees of religious schools and service
providers for weddings are in various stages of litigation. 11
In the legislative arena as well, religious liberty concerns have
increasingly surfaced as the primary area of dispute in the enactment of LGBT
equality legislation. In the Senate’s passage of legislation prohibiting sexual
orientation and gender identity discrimination in 2013, the only floor amendment
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adopted concerned exemptions for religiously-affiliated employers. 12 In state
legislatures, bills extending marriage rights to same-sex couples have often
triggered debate over the breadth of protection from liability for entities with
various degrees of religious affiliation. 13
One reason for the increased focus on exemptions from antidiscrimination
mandates is that the facial constitutionality of such exemptions is uncertain. They
can fall into a gray zone between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause, neither necessary nor impermissible. 14 Their absence does not
significantly burden the beliefs or practices of those who adhere to various faiths,
and they are not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Neither are they
necessarily prohibited by the Establishment Clause, because they generally do not
favor one religion over another, although they may favor religion over nonreligion. The precise location of where an exemption crosses the line in either
direction remains unclear.
The cultural intensity associated with disputes like those surrounding
homosexuality and religion illustrates the virtues of judicial restraint and of
adjudication on the narrowest possible grounds. While minimalism in the service
of pluralist accommodation can be a powerful virtue, these mechanisms for
defusing conflict come at a cost. As Jed Purdy as written, pluralism in practice
can seem “like riding a glass-bottomed boat over the colorful shoals of human
values,” 15 but courts do not have the luxury of pleasure cruising merely to see the
sights. Nor does it make sense to embark on every voyage with only the vaguest
map from those who have gone before.
12
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The GRC litigation was a particularly turbulent outing over those shoals,
and it offers lessons for contemporary debates. The D.C. court’s opinion also
provides an apt beginning point for situating current LGBT equality versus
religious liberty debates in a broader set of questions concerning the role of courts
in navigating treacherous cultural terrain. This article re-examines the GRC
decision with these two goals in mind and explores how it illuminates deficiencies
in both doctrine and political theory.
The article is divided roughly in half between analysis of doctrine and of
theory. I first critique the GRC decision doctrinally, focusing on the court’s
grappling with the expressive components of the two identities and the
uncertainties surrounding the distinction between recognition and endorsement.
GRC was a particularly challenging dispute to resolve because of the then-new
shifts in social meaning—that is, perceptions of the causes, consequences and
normative valence of certain beliefs and conduct—that confronted the court at
several levels of its analysis. I then update its analysis by examining how the
Supreme Court in the years since GRC has dealt with the same doctrinal
questions, identifying the inadequacies that remain. From there, I analyze a series
of more theoretical problems that lay beneath the surface of a pluralist and
minimalist approach to judging, including the proper role of courts, the
problematic social meaning of antidiscrimination law, and the indeterminacy of
both pluralist and religious belief systems.
More specifically, the order is as follows: In Part II, I tell the story of the
GRC case and explain why it resonates so closely with current and likely future
cases involving the conflict between gay equality and religious liberty. Simply
put, three distinct dynamics converge in this category of cases:
• A conflict between two groups or representative parties driven by
strong belief systems;
• A factual context in which questions of sexual morality are central;
and
• A legal framework of antidiscrimination statutes.
These factors tend to trigger emotional responses that impede a proper weighing
of the interests in contestation. Their cultural volatility also obscures the evolving
social meanings that attach to each one of the three, thus greatly complicating the
adjudicatory function. Disaggregating these points of tension is the first step in
understanding the complex doctrinal mechanics in cases like GRC.

I criticize the GRC court for its too-easy acceptance of the University’s
argument that its capacity to communicate adherence to Roman Catholic tenets on
homosexuality would be irreparably spoiled by the presence of a gay student
group. The court based its finding that the University violated the D.C.
antidiscrimination law on evidence that the school’s spoliation argument was
tainted by stereotyping the student group as necessarily asserting support for
every position in an imagined “gay agenda,” including hostility to religion. 16 This
finding effectively limited the holding to the particular facts of the case. Where
the court fell short, I argue, was in its failure to impose a duty on the larger, more
powerful expressive actor to mitigate any harm to its message by assuming the
burden to dissociate itself from the student group by engaging in more speech.
Part III explores cases in which the Supreme Court has confronted the
central questions present in GRC since that case was decided. I focus on two
themes. The first is whether an expressive institution’s tolerance of the presence
of an actor with a contrary message that contradicts the institutional speaker’s
message constitutes endorsement by the institution of that actor. Second, I trace
how the Court has grappled with the inseparability of a status characteristic and a
related expressive message.
I conclude that the law on both points remains unclear, but that it is also in
motion. The Court has both deferred too easily to an expressive institution’s
spoliation argument (repeating the mistake in GRC), 17 and, more recently, insisted
on a duty to mitigate expressive harm by dissociation. 18 When presented with an
argument that lesbian, gay, or bisexual status, implicated by an antidiscrimination
rule covering sexual orientation, could be separated from beliefs about the
morality of homosexual conduct, the Court rejected the proposition that the two
could be readily distinguished. 19 Yet the Justices have not analyzed, or even fully
engaged with, the complexities of expressive identity-based conflicts.
Part IV builds on the doctrinal analysis in Parts II and III and begins the
shift to a more theoretical orientation. In Part IV, I argue for a substantial
modification of the weight given to minimalist adjudication techniques—the
“passive virtues” —that have garnered widespread support by scholars
16
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commenting on the judicial role in the culture wars. I propose three interpretive
guidelines for lawmakers and lower courts confronted with conflicting normative
visions: a default principle that civil obedience is ideologically neutral; a lodestar
of enhancing voice and discouraging exit; and a commitment to protecting the
right to dissent from the antidiscrimination principle.
In Part V, I explore the social meaning of antidiscrimination laws, the
third problematic conceptual theme in GRC and one that is almost as culturally
dense and contested in its meanings as are the concepts of religion and sexuality.
Courts have upheld civil rights laws as viewpoint-neutral regulations of conduct
rather than expressions of belief, but this understanding runs counter to a massive
amount of descriptive commentary, as well as the history and popular discourse of
civil rights. The moralistic vision of antidiscrimination law has persisted, even as
civil rights laws have expanded to encompass issues directly related to sexuality.
This combination draws demands from religious groups for exemptions, including
Georgetown in the GRC litigation, on the theory that enforcement of LGBT
equality laws creates unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination against
conservative religious beliefs. The need for civil rights advocates to mobilize a
rhetoric other than moral legitimacy has gone unacknowledged, and I argue that
this should become a component of antidiscrimination discourse for the future.
Finally, Part VI interrogates the underlying concept of pluralism. I identify
how two inconsistent models using the same nomenclature of pluralism have
emerged in Free Exercise scholarship. I critique the newer model, which I
characterize as based on the concept of “state as player,” under which a truncated
state takes a back seat to expansive individualist rights to accommodation of
religious beliefs and practices. I endorse the state-as-umpire model, both because
it supplies the necessary resolution in a cosmopolitan democracy and because it is
the only approach that can effectively protect against the third-party harm that
results from exemptions.
Issues related to sexuality constitute a primary site for the negotiation of
pluralist values and challenges to those values. The epistemic dynamic is mutually
constitutive. Specifically, conflicts surrounding equality rights for openly gay
persons will redefine the cultural authority and social role of religious institutions,
as they simultaneously affect the meaning of equality.
II. THE GEORGETOWN “GAY RIGHTS CASE”: THE PERFECT STORM

In 1978, lesbian, gay and bisexual student groups on the main campus and
at the Law Center of Georgetown University sought recognition as official student
groups. When the University refused, the student groups filed suit under the D.C.
Human Rights Law, which had been amended three years earlier to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by public accommodations,
including educational institutions. 20 The University took the position that it could
not accede to the D.C. law without acquiescing to coerced speech. It argued that
granting official recognition to the gay student groups would communicate the
University’s endorsement of homosexuality, contrary to Catholic teaching. 21
When GRC reached the D.C. Court of Appeals, there was no precedent in
the context of LGBT equality for resolving the tension between the nation’s dual
commitments to equality of persons and tolerance for ideological dispute. In the
plurality decision written by Judge Julia Cooper Mack, the D.C. Court of Appeals
ruled that Georgetown University had to comply with D.C.’s prohibition by
furnishing equal material, but not philosophical, support to gay student
organizations. 22 The court thus split the atom of tolerance, separating what it
described as the material from the expressive components of the
antidiscrimination mandate.
The complexity of the issues produced a complex resolution, consisting of
seven separate opinions in the final en banc decision, preceded by majority and
dissenting opinions from a three-judge panel. 23 Three components of the dispute
converged to produce a particularly intense legal and social conflict. First, the
dispute required adjudicating between two nomic identity communities, each of
which had plausible legal claims. Second, the context of the dispute trenched on
the particularly volatile cluster of social meanings surrounding homosexuality. 24
Finally, the doctrinal framework in which the dispute arose was
antidiscrimination law, a body of law that is itself not simply a mechanism for
determining liability, but is also deeply inflected with suggestions of moral
20
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legitimacy. In a reflection of the importance to it of the principles involved, the
University sacrificed $200 million in tax-exempt bonds that the District declined
to offer while Georgetown was resisting enforcement of the antidiscrimination
statute. 25 Ultimately, the University President and Board of Directors acceded to
the court’s ruling despite pressure from counsel and Cardinal James Hickey to
seek further review in the Supreme Court. 26
Had any of these factors not been present, the emotional intensity register
of this litigation would have been significantly lower. Even had the dispute been
between the same two parties, for example, it would have not become an epic
saga lasting a decade and achieving widespread notoriety if the context had been
questions of scientific accuracy or if the legal framework had centered on contract
or torts. Instead, a trifecta of cultural crisis points melded into a perfect storm. It
is a storm that is likely to arise again.
The Georgetown case is conventionally— and not incorrectly —
understood as a battle of rights in which the liberty of religious expression and
belief was pitted against equality claims. A better understanding, however, is that
it was a battle of social meanings, or perhaps the first skirmish in one specific,
continuing battle. Explicitly at issue in the framing of the parties’ claims and
defenses, and in the text of the opinion, were the meanings of the act of
compliance with an antidiscrimination law, of openly expressed homosexuality,
and of the distinction between endorsement and toleration. What is missing from
Judge Mack’s opinion is a deeper engagement with these social meanings and
their legal and social consequences.
A. The Role of Expressive Identity in the Georgetown Case
In a dispute that pits claims of equality against those of religious liberty,
the equality claims may arise from the Equal Protection Clause or from civil
rights statutes. The religiously-affiliated defendant can disavow liability based on
some or all of three branches of First Amendment law: free expression, the
freedom of expressive association, and the free exercise of religion. The tests that
25
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a court must deploy to apply those defenses collapse into each other. 27 In each,
the court must determine whether enforcement of the equality claim would
significantly burden the defendant’s expression or religious beliefs or the capacity
of an organizational defendant to associate for expressive purposes. If a burden is
significant, the court must then assess whether there is a compelling state interest
in enforcing the equality mandate and whether its interest could be achieved with
comparable effectiveness by other means. The weight of the burden on the
speaker determines how great the obligation is on the state to justify its action.
State action that produces either silencing or coerced speech is generally per se
invalid.
This analytic construct structures the dispute in unfortunate ways. It
assigns equality interests to one party and expressive liberty interests to the other,
when it is almost always true that both sides embody both values. The “equality
plaintiff” is in fact communicating a message, and the “expressive defendant” is
seeking recognition for the cluster of identity affiliations that produced the point
of view it seeks to advance. Despite this complex social dynamic, constitutional
doctrine has artificially disaggregated the speaker and the message – a
nonsensical result in light of the way that social life is experienced.
In earlier work, I have described how what I have called the concept of
expressive identity—the social reality of integration between the identity of the
speaker and the viewpoint of her message–has cut across doctrines and confused
constitutional law. 28 Both protecting a group of people in a marginalized status
category from discrimination and fostering space for anti-orthodoxy messages
should be understood as part of the same project of furthering justice. Thus, if an
expressive identity—such as “gay” or “Christian”—is to be protected, the scope
of the equality protection for each group must include space for incorporating the
intrinsic message behind the group identity, rather than allowing the message of
either group (whether it is “gay is good” or “homosexual conduct is a sin”) to
negate the equality mandate.
The anomalies of legal doctrine that underlie the expressive identity
conundrum have produced contradictory framings by gay plaintiffs. 29 In First
27
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Amendment cases against state actors, LGBT plaintiffs have pressed claims
premised on dissent, with self-characterizations of LGBT identity as inherently
expressive. In situations such as the Georgetown case, involving private sector
defendants, LGBT plaintiffs have downplayed any expressive selfcharacterizations. In that type of case, the clearer the anti-orthodoxy viewpoint of
the group of LGBT plaintiffs, the stronger the defense by a private institution that
it cannot be dragooned into endorsement of ideas with which it disagrees.
The conundrum of expressive identity fractured the en banc court in GRC.
Because GRC involved a private university, the students had no First Amendment
claim and the University had no First Amendment obligation. What the
Georgetown students did have was the District of Columbia antidiscrimination
statute. Two judges asserted that the student groups represented a viewpoint
regarding the moral legitimacy of homosexuality, and that the local civil rights
law did not require Georgetown to treat all belief-driven groups equally. 30 Judge
Mack rejected this argument on the ground that the University had applied antiLGBT stereotypes in its rationale for non-recognition of the groups, thus placing
its policy into the category of status-based discrimination. 31 Without that
evidence, however, the group’s intrinsic “pro-gay” message could have defeated
its claim under the antidiscrimination law. By extension, other openly LGBT
persons and organizations could have been left unprotected against exclusions by
private entities with an expressive function, as indeed later occurred with the Boy
Scouts. 32
Two other members of the court found that the expressive components of
openly lesbian, gay, and bisexual identity had to be accepted as part of the
equality claim, thus implicitly recognizing and endorsing the expressive identity
critique. 33 These judges considered it bogus for Georgetown to claim that its
differential treatment of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual students could be separated
from the very kind of bias that the antidiscrimination law was enacted to prohibit.
30
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Based on the evidence of stereotyping, Judge Mack’s opinion elided the
conflict about whether the claim of the LGBT equality organization was better
understood as challenging a private institution’s hostility to gay students or as
challenging the institution’s protected right to express antipathy to the idea that
homosexuality should be a neutral factor in its operating policies. This elision
enabled the court to avoid taking a position on whether the foundation of the gay
students group’s claim was status or viewpoint. The court thereby ducked the
question of the social meaning of toleration of contrary expression by a speaker
with a sincere objection to a particular form of equality. The court achieved a
compromise between competing normative visions only by avoiding the meaning
of those visions.
The conceptual frame of expressive identity seeks to engage head-on with
these anomalies. It incorporates these complexities by recognizing that the
identity characteristic that grounds any equality claim is in fact an amalgam of
status, expression, and often conduct. Religious affiliation and sexual orientation
are perhaps the two clearest examples of such an amalgam: each characteristic
melds a social demographic, a set of practices and, as Justice Kennedy described
religion, “a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of
subjects may be discussed and considered.” 34 The conceptual frame of expressive
identity thus integrates the expressive aspects of any antidiscrimination claim as
intrinsic to, rather than contradictory to, equality norms. In doing so, it offers a
realistic appreciation that recognition claims are intrinsically communicative of
ideas and beliefs.
The Supreme Court has noted the risk that pretextual claims of shared
beliefs by an association could hide discriminatory policies of excluding certain
persons. 35 Assessing the sincerity of a group’s expressive function can be tricky.
In general, I would accord wide latitude for all expressive associations, including
those of a religious nature, but I would not eliminate the judicial role of guarding
against exemptions that are based on suspiciously recent central beliefs from
antidiscrimination laws. As the number of such cases increases, the need increases
for greater clarity of analysis as well, something the Court has not yet achieved.
34
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B. Conflicting Views of “Endorsement”
Baked into the problem of expressive identity is the contention that when
an institution allows the presence of certain expressive actors, such as openly gay
plaintiffs or groups, it is reasonable to infer that the institution has endorsed some
variation of the belief that homosexuality is morally or socially acceptable. In the
Georgetown case, the University rested its First Amendment defenses most
heavily on the argument that recognition of the gay student organizations would
be “interpreted by many” as an endorsement of homosexuality by the
University. 36 Georgetown thus alleged a burden on its expression rights because
of what it asserted was the social meaning of recognizing the gay student groups.
The claim by Georgetown and similar institutions that their own
expressive messages have been hijacked and twisted amounts to a spoliation
defense—that is, that its religious position on homosexuality is spoiled by the
presence of an openly gay student group on campus. My argument, in response,
is two-fold. First, I agree that the first part of a proper doctrinal response is to
employ an objective test of whether there has been spoliation of the speaker’s
message. I recognize, however, that objectivity is easier said than done; in a
culturally-loaded context such as that in the GRC litigation, objectivity can seem
like a chimera. Second, I argue that changing social meanings result in changing
the degree of burden on expression (even under a properly objective test) and that
this reality must be taken into account in the doctrinal analysis.
In her analysis for the D.C. Court of Appeals, Judge Mack eschewed
objectivity. Instead, her opinion deferred to the University on gauging the
expressive impact dynamics in the case. Not only did Judge Mack’s opinion
accept the University’s understanding of the content of Roman Catholic tenets on
the subject of homosexuality, as it should have, but it also deferred to the
University’s argument that recognition of a student organization would inevitably
communicate endorsement of the activities and beliefs of that student
organization. 37 In the University’s view, being required to recognize a gay student
group, while otherwise taking no position on the group, was equivalent to
36
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mandated neutrality by the University regarding the group, which was in turn
equivalent to endorsement of the group and hence, of homosexuality. Expert
testimony by clergy advanced this argument as part of Roman Catholic doctrine. 38
The University further argued that it would be seen as having endorsed not only
the campus activities, but also whatever movement efforts and messages
emanated from the entire gay rights movement beyond the campus. 39
The court’s acceptance of this analysis led to the conclusion that the D.C.
statute could not require the University to recognize the gay student groups
without violating the University’s First Amendment right against coerced
speech. 40 In effect, the court defined a particular religious constituency as the
relevant metric for determining the effect of compliance with a civil rights law,
rather than the presumptively secular publics of the student body, the faculty, and
neutral observers. The result was a fundamentally subjective analysis.
The court accepted this analysis without significant assessment of the
reality of the University. Georgetown University is not a congregation or religious
order, but a large university that has chosen to function in a national, secular
academic environment. It does not limit the faculty, staff or student body by
religious affiliation or adherence to tenets of the Roman Catholic faith. It is a full
and flourishing member of the intellectual and economic marketplace of higher
education. Central to the role of even private universities is their uniquely broad
openness to all manner of viewpoints.
It is easy to criticize the finding of an endorsement effect from the
perspective of twenty-five years later, all the more so in light of Georgetown’s
own changes. 41 But, a defender of the decision for its pluralist value might argue,
meanings shift; the social meanings of ideas are not frozen. Surely there is no
better example of that than debates over equality rights for lesbians and gay men.
Gay identity signifies an issue and a group that was once seen as “beyond the
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pale,” 42 but gay equality now harmonizes with civil rights more generally, with
increasing success in the political arena. Only two years before the en banc
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that same-sex partners had no constitutionally
protected right to sexual privacy. 43 Perhaps the contention that gay presence
implied endorsement, however strained now, was at least plausibly right then.
Even if we assume for purposes of argument that the court was correct to
accept Georgetown’s claim that the presence of a gay student group might create
the perception that the University endorsed homosexuality or gay rights, the court
should not have stopped its analysis there. First Amendment law requires an
inquiry into whether the speaker whose message is allegedly being coerced
nonetheless has the power to eliminate the distortion of its views by affirmative
dis-attribution—i.e., by taking steps to communicate its non-endorsement of
certain messages, in ways that will reasonably counter any false perceptions of
agreement. 44
The duty to mitigate spoliation of one’s message by dissociation from the
spoiler provides courts with a mechanism for allocating the burdens of tolerance
and dissent in a dispute over expressive space. As cultural shifts alter the
perception of endorsement, the burden of disassociation will become lighter.
In GRC, the appellate panel and the en banc court parted ways at this step
of the analysis. 45 The panel had accepted, arguendo, Georgetown’s fear of a
perception of endorsement, but had concluded that there were many mechanisms
available to the University for distancing itself from a gay student group and
clarifying that it did not accept the group’s message. 46 Such actions, the panel
reasoned, would mitigate any burden on the University’s First Amendment rights.
The en banc court resolved the endorsement/dissociation question in
precisely the opposite way. Unlike the panel, the en banc court accepted the trial
court’s factual finding that the spoliation of the University’s message by the gay
42
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student group was irreparable. 47 For that reason, Judge Mack’s opinion for the en
banc court concluded that Georgetown did not need to recognize the student
group, although it was required to provide the group with various material
supports. Judge Mack’s opinion left undecided any issue of disassociation. 48
During settlement agreements following the court’s decision, 49 the burden of
dissociation eventually came to rest on the student groups, requiring the groups to
state affirmatively that, despite their use of the name “Georgetown,” there was no
official university recognition of the groups. 50
The GRC court’s treatment of both prongs of the relevant doctrine was
inadequate: it gave short shrift to the need for an objective standard for assessing
whether there is perceived endorsement when a university recognizes a student
group, and it failed to address a duty of mitigation on the part of the university.
In the end, the D.C. court developed its own approach to the allocation of
discursive space, but without articulating a coherent rationale to assist courts in
later cases.
C. The Role of Antidiscrimination Law in GRC
What no doubt astounded Georgetown University and its lawyers in the
1980’s was that their position condemning homosexual conduct, grounded in
clear religious doctrine, was seen as only morally equivalent – rather than morally
superior—to the implicit normative premise of a statute that forbade differential
treatment based on sexual orientation. In its ultimate resolution of the conflict, the
D.C. Court of Appeals in effect granted that the University had a moral autonomy
right to take a normatively wrong position, but held that the antidiscrimination
law constrained the University from imposing material harm as a result of its
position. 51
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The association of this cluster of moral meanings with antidiscrimination
law forms no part of any judicial holding of which I am aware, although the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bob Jones University v. United States 52 comes close.
The Court in Bob Jones held that the public policy against racial segregation was
so strong that it trumped the right of a conservative Christian college to maintain a
discriminatory admissions policy based on its religious beliefs. 53 Although
multiple utilitarian arguments about the value of diversity to the quality of
education can justify antidiscrimination requirements, it seems a stretch to
imagine that the court would have disallowed a religion-based exception had the
only state interest been that of encouraging high standards in university education.
Instead, the power of the Bob Jones decision lies in its normative punch.
In GRC, the court addressed the related question of whether the District
had a compelling interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination. In the
first appellate opinion, the panel held that this goal was equally “‘compelling’ or
‘overriding’” as the interest in eliminating discrimination based on race or sex,
and cited Bob Jones as controlling precedent for the proposition that
antidiscrimination goals outweighed religious liberty interests. 54
Judge Mack, the third member of the original panel, dissented from its
judgment in part because she disagreed with this reading of Bob Jones. To her,
“the majority’s equation” of race and sexual orientation discrimination, in light of
the constitutional history associated with the former, was “far-fetched.” 55 In her
opinion for the full court, Judge Mack walked back the implications of her “farfetched” characterization in a lengthy section of the en banc opinion that recounts
the history of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Although it describes
such discrimination as an “evil,” 56 the court acknowledged approaching this part
of its analysis with “more than a little trepidation.” 57 Except for a few passing
references, 58 the Bob Jones decision is not mentioned.
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In the dispute over comparing discrimination based on sexual orientation
to that based on race, both sides realized that an important cultural good was at
stake. The most valuable resource that Georgetown lost in the GRC litigation was
not the avoidance of extending relatively insignificant material benefits to the gay
student groups. Rather, its major loss was the exclusivity of its claim to moral
superiority in the public sphere, a position that in turn had served to reaffirm the
superiority of its private definition of morality.
D. Summary
We have seen in this part how deeply contingent the decision in the
Georgetown case was on social meanings in three key dimensions: the expressive
connotations of both gay identity and religious affiliation; the contested
interpretations of which actions communicate “endorsement” of a position or
viewpoint; and the normative implications of a judicial finding that the university
violated a civil rights law.
My critique thus far has been primarily doctrinal. Judge Mack and those
who have celebrated the decision, however, would doubtless argue that doctrinal
deconstruction misses the bigger points: that the court’s compromise solution
enabled both parties to retain their dignity and fostered future dialogic
engagement. In the historical context of the 1980s, this assessment may be
correct. But we must also ask how best to protect and foster cultural diversity
now.
Beginning in Part IV, infra, I will address broader questions of political
theory raised in GRC and similar cases. Before reaching those points, however, it
is important to bring the doctrinal analysis up to date.
III. EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE SINCE GRC
Since GRC was decided, the Supreme Court has been forced to confront
the same three tensions present in the Georgetown case. The result has been a
mixture of partial clarification and uneven reasoning, with patches of
emotionalism.
A. Spoliation and Endorsement

In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court found that the Scouts’ right to
expressive association barred New Jersey from applying a law against sexual
orientation discrimination in the selection of an assistant scoutmaster. 59 Although
Dale can be read as superseding GRC, it can also be distinguished: Dale involved
a leadership position in an organization for children and adolescents, rather than
the presence of one among many student groups available to young adults in a
university setting. What is consistent in both GRC, and Dale, however, is the
courts’ avoidance of the feasibility of dis-attribution.
The expressive association test that the Court used in Dale asked only
what would be the burden of Dale’s presence on the Scouts’ ability to disseminate
their chosen message. The Court deferred, in a perfunctory manner, to the Scouts’
assertion that it taught that homosexual conduct is morally wrong and that the
presence of a gay assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden its expressive
integrity. 60 The primary dissent argued that the Scouts had failed to demonstrate a
meaningful burden, both because of lack of evidence that its views on
homosexuality were consistent and unequivocal over time and because of the
excess significance being accorded to homosexuality. 61 But neither opinion
engaged directly the importance of assessing whether the excluder could
effectively disassociate itself from the party seeking inclusion. The absence of
that step in the doctrinal analysis enabled the majority’s too-easy finding of an
unconstitutional burden.
Thus, the dissociation point escaped analysis. All of the Justices alluded to
changing popular opinion on homosexuality, 62 but none understood why changing
popular opinion was relevant. Justice Stevens’s references to specific indicia of
this change seemed to be intended as a counter to, and a calling-out of, more
conservative views as “atavistic.” 63 The imprecision of his references elicited
distancing comments from his fellow dissenters. Shifts in popular opinion did not,
as Justice Souter’s separate dissent correctly stated, affect in any way whether the
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Scouts’ views were entitled to presumptive protection under the First
Amendment. 64
What is important about changes in public opinion regarding LGBT
equality is that they reflect shifts in social meaning that undercut the weight of the
expressive burden on the Scouts. This dynamic should have been factored into the
Court’s analysis. The Scouts asserted that including an openly gay Scoutmaster
would create the perception that the Scouts endorsed homosexuality, the same
argument made by Georgetown. 65 This argument depends on both the assumption
that a reasonable observer would draw that conclusion and that there were no
effective dissociation steps that the Scouts could take to counter it.
As homosexuality becomes more accepted in the society at large, the
reasonable person’s interpretation of gay presence changes. The evolving
opinions either in favor of or neutral about homosexuality do not disqualify antigay opinion from First Amendment shelter. But they do affect the calculus as to
what is a reasonable duty to mitigate by dissociation because they increase the
likelihood that such dissociation will be effective. To the extent that efforts to
dissociate succeed, the spoliation of the anti-gay speaker’s message diminishes.
For these reasons, determining who bears the burden of dissociation or
dis-attribution in this situation is critical. For expressive harm as for material
harm, the law should place the burden on the party with the greatest capacity to
absorb it, generally the party having the greatest capacity to disseminate its own
views. If there is risk that reasonable persons would perceive that X’s tolerance of
Y’s presence signals a change in X’s worldview, then fashioning a remedy that
requires X to generate more expression increases the articulation of both antiLGBT and pro-LGBT views and strengthens the norm of tolerance.
One could object that to understand legal outcomes as turning on cultural
changes is to invite ambiguity and judicial over-reaching. It is precisely the
dissociation test that could alleviate that risk, however. Asking whether concrete
mechanisms exist by which the excluder could effectively communicate its own
views, despite an unwanted expressive identity presence, would constitute a test
for allocating the burdens of tolerance and dissent that is far more consistent with
norms of both equality and expression than the deference employed by the courts
in GRC and Dale.
64
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In two other cases, analogous in different ways to GRC, the Court did
employ a dissociation test. Both involved a university that asserted spoliation of
expression: that either funding for a student religious group or the presence of
military recruiters would undercut the message intended by the university. In
Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, a public university argued that paying expenses
for a Christian student publication would so distort the university’s policy of
neutrality that it would create an Establishment Clause violation. 66 In Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), a consortium of law
schools challenged a statute requiring that military recruiters have equal access to
campus placement services. 67 The schools argued that compliance would undercut
their policies against allowing entities with discriminatory employment policies to
recruit on campus. 68 In both Rosenberger and FAIR, the Court found that the
burden on speech could be sufficiently mitigated by university efforts publicizing
their own messages of neutrality or commitment to equality, respectively. 69
One may argue that Dale and FAIR can be distinguished from each other
and from GRC by the particular branch of First Amendment law that was found to
be decisive. Both the Scouts and FAIR asserted a combination of expressive
association and coerced speech claims. The Court decided Dale on expressive
association grounds, and FAIR on coerced speech grounds. For some purposes,
the two doctrines appropriately diverge. In expressive association law, and not in
coerced speech litigation, the court must inquire as to the bona fides of the
expressive characteristics of an organization and whether the views in contention
have in fact been consistently, repeatedly expressed. 70 For the individual or
organization claiming that expression is being commandeered in service of a
particular message, the history of past views is largely irrelevant.
But both are branches of law in service of the same principles. When there
is a conflict in rights, as there is in claims to inclusion in a venue that is itself
communicative, the same balancing of expressive burdens should attach. The
question of whether the impact on the message of the excluder can be mitigated
by reasonable steps to dissociate from the intruder should factor into both
66
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analyses. The outcomes in both categories of cases should foster the purposes and
normative values of freedom of both expression and equality.
B. Untangling Expressive Identity
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court has directly grappled
with the expressive identity conundrum is Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.71
Here, the Christian Legal Society (CLS) cast itself as the functional equivalent of
the Boy Scouts in Boy Scouts Association v. Dale: 72 a norm-driven expressive
association that excluded persons based on the particular combination of beliefs,
status and conduct that antidiscrimination laws have treated as sexual orientation.
In its reasoning, the Court acknowledged the expressive aspects of conflicting
identities more directly than it ever had before
In CLS, the Court considered antidiscrimination claims by a conservative
religious student group that challenged the policy of a public university limiting
recognition to organizations that allowed all students to participate in all
recognized organizations. CLS argued that denying it recognition constituted a
viewpoint-based exclusion from a limited public forum, in violation of its
expressive association rights. CLS contended that its policy of excluding those—
including lesbian, gay, and bisexual students—who did not comport with its
philosophy that only heterosexual intimacy within marriage could be moral
amounted to limiting membership eligibility based on viewpoint. In any event,
CLS argued, it did not discriminate based on the per se status of sexual
orientation. 73
Faced with this Boy Scouts-like argument, the Court distinguished the case
from Dale because the right of CLS to continue its membership policies without
recognition as a student group was not in question. CLS had other options. 74 The
majority declined to attempt to disaggregate the components of expressive
identity. Nonetheless, the five majority Justices acknowledged that these
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characteristics congealed into one meaningful concept of identity. In that, they
were joined, albeit backhandedly, by the dissent.
1. The Boy Scouts Redux Strategy
CLS is an association of law students and lawyers with chapters at a
number of law schools. When the Hastings College of Law chapter of CLS sought
official university recognition, it was denied on the ground that CLS violated the
Hastings requirement that recognition would not be granted to student
organizations that discriminated based on certain specified grounds, including
sexual orientation. During the litigation, Hastings specified that the nondiscrimination requirement also meant that student organizations had to accept all
students as participants, members, or leaders “regardless of their status or
beliefs.” 75 Hastings took no position on the morality of any form of sexual
conduct.
CLS refused membership to anyone who disagreed with its belief that
“sexual activity should not occur outside of marriage between a man and a
woman . . . [including] anyone who engages in unrepentant homosexual
conduct.” 76 When its request for official student organization status was denied on
the ground that it violated the antidiscrimination policy, CLS contended that the
state through its public university was prohibited from penalizing CLS’s right of
expression and association based on a requirement of equal treatment that
conflicted with the organization’s views on sexual morality.
“[T]his is an a fortiori case under Dale,” CLS argued, 77 citing the Scouts’
right to exclude Dale because his inclusion would subvert the Scouts’ right to
express its view that homosexuality was incompatible with Scouting. Like the
Scouts, CLS emphasized, it too based its exclusionary policy on its beliefs.
Therefore, it could not be required to admit all comers, including those who
manifestly disagreed with its philosophy, a group that included, but was not
limited to, lesbian, gay, and bisexual students. CLS asserted that it could not
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effectively continue to communicate its viewpoint if it was forced to accept
members who disagreed.
The Court rejected the argument. Agreeing that the “First Amendment
shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization’s expressive activity,”
the Court nonetheless ruled that, while the holding in Dale fell within the scope of
that principle, the facts in CLS did not. 78 At issue was not a prohibition of
expression but the denial of a form of public subsidy. Using the all-comers policy
as the basis for subsidy decisions was justified, the Court found, as a reasonable
way to administer the system of student organizations.
2. Hinting at Expressive Identity
The CLS litigation was complicated by a dispute over whether Hastings
had in fact relied on an all-comers requirement to deny recognition or whether the
denial was based on solely the antidiscrimination mandate. If the latter, CLS
contended that other student groups were allowed to exclude based on viewpoint,
and that it, as a religious organization, was singled out as ineligible to control its
membership in that way. Chief Justice Roberts was sympathetic to the
ramifications:
[G]ender or race is fundamentally different from
religious [belief]. Gender and race is a status. [sic]
Religious belief, it has to be based on the
fundamental notion that we are not open to
everybody. We have beliefs, you have to subscribe
to them. And we have always regarded that as a
good thing. 79
In the trial court, the parties had stipulated that to secure formal status, a
student group had to allow “any student” to participate, using as an example that a
Democratic club had to admit Republicans. 80 Hastings denied the allegation that
the all-comers policy was not being enforced or that CLS was turned down on
other grounds. 81 In the Supreme Court, however, CLS argued that the earlier
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version of the policy had been applied, that prohibited discrimination but did
apply the all-comers policy in all instances and that, in any event, both versions of
the policy were unconstitutional.
Based on the stipulation, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court
analyzed only the all-comers policy, accepting that it was applied equally to all
student groups. In response to the CLS argument that even with an accept-allcomers policy, Hastings had a constitutional obligation to allow viewpoint-based
exclusions for a viewpoint-based group, the Court demurred from imposing such
a difficult enforcement task on the university. The CLS demand that “Hastings
permit exclusion because of belief but forbid discrimination due to status . . .
would impose on Hastings a daunting labor. How should the Law School go about
determining whether a student organization cloaked prohibited status exclusion in
belief-based garb?” 82
The majority opinion implied that viewpoint was inseparable from identity
or status, at least for a religious group. The Court acknowledged the assertion by
CLS that it did not “exclude individuals because of sexual orientation, but rather
‘on the basis of a conjunction of conduct and the belief that the conduct is not
wrong.’” 83 In the next sentence rebutting the point, the Court substituted “status”
for “the belief that the conduct is not wrong”: “Our decisions have declined to
distinguish between status and conduct in this context.” 84 Fairly read, the two
sentences strongly suggest recognition that the concept of “status” encompasses a
message that one believes that the conduct defining the status is moral. This
precise combination constitutes expressive identity.
Justice Stevens, in concurrence, went further and argued explicitly that the
identity status associated with religious affiliation or homosexuality necessarily
and correctly incorporates viewpoint. 85 He more clearly recognized the category
of expressive identity but without labeling it as such. He agreed with the main
opinion as to the validity of the all-comers policy, but also found that Hastings
could have enforced a ban on sexual orientation discrimination against a religious
student group, even if other clubs were allowed to limit membership based on a
shared philosophy. To do otherwise, he said, would eviscerate the goal of barring
82
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status-based discrimination: “A person’s religion often simultaneously constitutes
or informs a status, an identity, a set of beliefs and practices, and much else
besides. (So does sexual orientation for that matter . . .).” 86
The four dissenting Justices would have found both versions of the policy
unconstitutional. The original policy, Justice Alito wrote, constituted viewpointbased discrimination because its effect was to bar only religious groups from
excluding members who did not share their beliefs, and because it discriminated
against groups, like CLS, that expressed a viewpoint on sexual morality not
shared by the University. 87 Implicitly, this opinion also grasped the basic truth
behind the concept of expressive identity: that social identity is too capacious to
be distilled into two pure categories, one status, one viewpoint. Although the
members of the court diverged over how to apply the insight, they appear to have
all agreed that sexual orientation and religion both exemplify this concept.
Justice Alito concluded that, even if the viewpoint was neutral on its face,
the all-comers policy was adopted as a pretext for discriminating against the
religious group. 88 His dissent raised the question to which we will return in Part
IV: whether antidiscrimination policies, when enforced against religious entities
on behalf of gay plaintiffs, are themselves the reflection of bias. Four members of
the Court appeared ready to adopt the CLS argument that enforcement of the
antidiscrimination policy created a disparate negative impact on religious entities
that express a belief that homosexual conduct is morally wrong. 89
C. Summary
The law’s treatment of expressive identity remains unclear. The Supreme
Court has both declined to factor in the duty to dissociate when the presence of an
equality claimant would arguably spoil the message of an expressive institution
(Dale), and has also insisted on such a duty (FAIR). The Court has recognized the
complexities of the combined and mutually reinforcing effects of conduct, status,
and viewpoint. As with the ambivalent guidance regarding a duty to dissociate,
however, it has not clarified a mode of analysis for expressive identity claims.
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IV. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A KULTURKAMPF
In the wake of backlash that is often mobilized around the theme of
“judicial activism,” American courts and scholars have sought shelter in a
renewed emphasis on the virtues of judicial modesty and restraint. Especially but
not only in cases that arouse strong public reactions, there is broad agreement that
courts should rely on a minimalist or passive approach to adjudication. 90 LGBT
equality cases provide a particularly stark challenge to judges, one that has
literally threatened the judicial function by producing election campaigns against
judges who have voted to legalize same-sex marriage. 91
Judicial minimalism is the jurisprudence of pluralism, providing a buffer
zone both for the interest groups involved and for the judges themselves.
It functions as a philosophical speed bump, a warning that courts should proceed
with prudence and caution when a dispute enters the field of highly contested
religious and moral values. More deeply, the underlying goal of minimalism is to
enhance the processes of democratic deliberation by which such issues can be
resolved by politically accountable decision makers, outside the often zero-sum
world of litigation. 92
Judge Mack’s opinion in GRC is a model of such minimalism. It rejected
the all-or-nothing litigation posture of the parties in GRC, and deployed several
standard techniques for “leaving things undecided”: emphasizing statutory rather
than constitutional grounds, limiting the resolution to the distinctive facts of the
particular set of circumstances, and eschewing the announcement of broad rules
for future cases. Its result was to foster dialogic engagement between the parties:
in fact, they negotiated a settlement agreement that embodied the principles of the
decision. Since that time, conditions for LGBT students at Georgetown have
greatly improved. 93
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The value of judicial minimalism in a constitutional democracy is selfevident but not unmixed. Moreover, “maximalism” is not the only alternative.
Rather than broad pronouncements of principles to govern future cases, courts
could deploy much more focused burden-shifting mechanisms. In this Part, I
identify three broader principles that would decrease the ambiguous nature of
minimalism-driven results without sacrificing the advantages of judicial restraint.
The duty to dissociate discussed above is one such specific doctrinal device.
Consider the following to be a suggestion for judicial minimalism 2.0.
A. Civil Obedience
One problem circulating in the background of religious liberty defenses to
equality claims is that changes in social meaning can and do produce changes in
law, and thus can be decisive of legal disputes. Neutral principles are not
unchanging principles. The facts in GRC illustrate it well: as we have seen,
Georgetown asserted that its recognition of the gay students groups would have
created the perception, at least in the minds of some, that the university endorsed
homosexuality, thus spoiling its own message. I have suggested that this was not
an unreasonable claim 30 years ago when the case was being litigated, although it
would be today. I have also argued that the D. C. Court of Appeals was
nonetheless mistaken in its analysis of endorsement because it did not explore the
means available to the University to cure any spoliation by affirmative disattribution.
But there is a more fundamental criticism that relates to the expressive
functions of law. Georgetown’s argument depended on the premise that
compliance with a law of general application sends any message at all. The
relevant baseline question should be not whether voluntary university recognition
would have created a perception of endorsement, but whether mandated
compliance with a law would have created such a perception.
To analyze whether the extent of the burden on religion caused by
obedience with a law is justified, courts examine the state’s interest in enacting
the law. The Supreme Court has found that some burdens are not justified 94 and
that other burdens are overridden by the public interest served by the law. 95 The
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problem with this analysis is that it skips an important threshold step:
consideration of whether the acts necessary to comply with the law are expressive
or merely instrumental. Some are expressive; some are not. I agree that individual
religious actors may experience obeying a particular law as a burden, and I would
not find all such burdens acceptable. Not wearing a yarmulke when one’s faith
demands it as a sign of respect to God, 96 or being forced to work on the day one
believes to be the Sabbath, 97 are intrinsically expressive acts that generally create
no harm to third parties. They are qualitatively different from paying income tax
or administering a business or an institution that is a public accommodation.
Absent a literal forcing of expression 98 or coercion of specific, highly personal
actions contrary to the religious commands of a certain faith, civil obedience is
not the same as agreement.
The premise that ministerial acts of civil obedience are not expressive is
well-established. It has long been a part of the jurisprudence of antidiscrimination
law in the context of race. Whites who resisted integration feared loss of business
if they voluntarily desegregated because their customers might perceive them as
agreeing with practices of racial mixing. The law that made desegregation
compulsory protected them against that risk. 99 The same understanding attached
to arguments by a religious school that admission of African-American students
would undercut its belief that segregation had a Scriptural basis:
Although the school leadership’s voluntary
enrollment of blacks might communicate such a
message, desegregation in response to a federal
court’s implementation of the congressional
mandate of § 1981 would not. Much as merchants
were freed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from any
fear that white customers react adversely to the
acceptance of black business, parents and school
leaders are freed by § 1981 from any fear that
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children will interpret acceptance of blacks as an
indication of church approval of the practice. 100
The school at issue in this case was typical of a much broader phenomenon. The
number of private all-white Christian schools mushroomed in the 1960s and
1970s in the South, a development that most observers attributed primarily to the
effort to avoid desegregation. 101 The Southern Regional Council, for example,
stated in 1973 that “Christian schools and segregation academies are almost
synonymous.” 102
In those cases, courts recognized that the excess social significance of race
should not be permitted to down the presumptive neutrality of civil obedience. In
the vast range of business and other institutional practices, acts that are required to
obey a neutral law send no signal as to the wisdom of that law. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby took a dangerous step back from that
understanding.
In Hobby Lobby, the Court held that requiring closely-held corporations to
comply with a mandate to provide health insurance coverage for certain
contraceptives violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act when the
corporate owners objected to such coverage based on their religious beliefs. 103
The Court characterized its holding as “very specific” to that factual context104
and “concerned solely with the contraceptive mandate.” 105 The case presented a
threat of “severe” economic consequences to the plaintiffs of non-compliance, 106
coupled with “precisely zero” negative impact on third parties, 107 because of an
already existing mechanism created by the government for providing exemptions
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to nonprofit entities. 108 The Court specifically disavowed “the possibility that
discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as
religious practice to escape legal sanction.” 109
It is too early to know whether the decision in Hobby Lobby will prove to
be as exotic as these limitations suggest or will come to be seen as the camel’s
nose under the tent. The limitation to race discrimination as the barrier against
pretext is deeply disturbing at best. The excess significance of sexuality in the
construction of definitions of morality should not so easily lead to a different
result than in race-related cases.
B. Voice, Not Exit
The second principle that should guide courts in culturally volatile cases
such as GRC builds on the first. If obeying a generally applicable law does not
communicate a message, an objecting individual has two options. The first option
is voice; the second is exit. In adjudicating such disputes, judges should interpret
doctrine and fashion remedies with the goals of fostering voice and discouraging
exit.
By voice, I mean that that the individual or entity complying with an
antidiscrimination law can actively express its disagreement with the implicit
message of such a law—e.g., the message that sexual orientation is a morally
neutral characteristic and that discrimination on that basis is wrong. The voice in
this situation is the voice of dissent. The second option—exit—can take multiple
forms. It may result in civil disobedience or in withdrawal from the activities
being regulated, as when Catholic adoption agencies have ceased providing
services to government agencies rather than comply with an antidiscrimination
law.
In effect, the consequence of treating civil obedience as non-expressive is
to allocate the burden of dissent (or exit) onto the civil rights objector. Ironically,
the burden and right of dissent, should the party exercise it, constitutes a form of
coming out—in this instance coming out as an objector to the antidiscrimination
message embodied in a majoritarian law.
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Consider the subtle but important difference that this allocation of burden
would have made in GRC. What actually occurred, after the litigation ended, was
that the gay student groups agreed to include statements in their publications that
the University did not endorse the positive views toward homosexuality that the
student group communicated. There is a whiff of shaming in this result. By
contrast, had the University stated in relevant materials that it did not endorse the
views of the gay student groups (or, more appropriately, of any student groups),
the implicit positioning would have signaled that Georgetown was the entity that
needed to dissent, that antidiscrimination was the norm. Requiring Georgetown to
state its own position would not have disrespected that position, but it would have
aligned the remedy with the fact that the D.C. antidiscrimination statute had
shifted the baseline norm.
There are other advantages to structuring a remedy that allocates the
burden to dissent in this way. It furthers an important goal of pluralist governance,
which is to enliven the diversity of viewpoints available in the culture. Rather
than suppress opposition to an antidiscrimination mandate, such a remedy
facilitates it.
One may object that pressuring an organizational or institutional dissenter
to express its views more publicly could have the disadvantage of making internal
change slower and more difficult. If an institutional dissenter is forced to dig in its
heels and defend its opposition to a civil rights law, the ideological diversity
within the group may diminish, leading to less willingness to change. While I
acknowledge this risk, it seems to me that a mark of greater respect for the
dissenter’s position is to allow such change to occur, or not, against the backdrop
of greater transparency of the views being espoused.
The compromise result that the GRC court fashioned is understandable,
given the appropriate desire to preserve the dignity of both parties. But there is a
better and more focused principle than minimalism or pluralism for courts to use
as guidance: the goal of fostering voice and discouraging exit.
C. Protecting Dissent
The final component of the adjudicatory principles that I offer here can be
stated simply: together with a goal of enhancing dissent and discouraging exit
comes the concomitant responsibility of courts to protect the right of dissent to

which objectors are entitled. When popular opinion is changing, the pressure to
conform to suddenly reversed norms can be harsh.
In Okwedy v. Molinari, 110 for example, the Second Circuit correctly
accorded scope for dissent from antidiscrimination norms. In that case, a church
had contracted with a commercial vendor of billboard space to display a Bible
verse condemning homosexuality in Staten Island, New York. Soon after the
billboards were posted, the vendor received a letter from the Borough President
stating that the display “conveys an atmosphere of intolerance which is not
welcome in our borough . . . [P]lease contact . . . my legal counsel . . . to discuss
further the issues I have raised in this letter.” 111 The vendor removed the signs.
When the church and its pastor sued, the district court dismissed their First
Amendment claims on the grounds that the Borough President did not have
regulatory authority over the vendor and that his letter merely called for dialogue
rather than threatening economic retribution. 112 The Second Circuit reversed,
finding a sufficient basis for inferring threats by a public official, even if not of
official power, to require that the claims be reinstated. 113
A situation such as the use of public billboards presents the easiest case
for recognizing the importance of the First Amendment rights of those who
oppose LGBT equality, because it raises no problems of captive or susceptible
audiences or the potential for workplace disruption. Even in situations in which
those other concerns are present, however, courts need to exercise special care to
ensure that enforcement of antidiscrimination laws and norms does not silence the
voices of those who disagree.
In Good News Employee Association v. Hicks, members of an employee
group posted notices in the workplace describing the organization as “a forum for
people of Faith to express their views on . . . . the Natural Family, Marriage and
Family values [sic].” 114 The employer, a public agency, removed the flyers on the
ground that the language was homophobic and could promote harassment based
on sexual orientation, a result upheld by the trial and appellate courts. The district
court acknowledged that this was a close case: on the one hand, the employer had
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an independent right to prevent disruption in the workplace and there had been a
complaint; on the other hand, the language was not inflammatory and only one
complaint had been filed. 115 On balance, the court found that group had only a de
minimis protectable right to post messages when regulation of the system
properly lay in the employer’s discretion.
In my view, this was too narrow a view of the rights of the conservative
employees’ group. The language of its flyer was too mild, and the principle of
protecting dissent too important, to justify the removal. Although the context was
a workplace, where other employees are to some extent a captive audience, a flyer
on a bulletin board is not difficult to ignore, and there was no evidence that the
group’s message was targeted to specific individuals.
The school T-shirt cases present the most difficult situations to assess,
because the context involves minors and schools’ appropriate desire to insulate
them from messages that might impair the learning environment even without
causing measurable disruption. There is no easy way to distinguish between
“homosexuality is shameful,” 116 “straight pride,” 117 and “be happy, not gay.”118
As Judge Posner noted, derogatory comments about “a sexual orientation that
deviates from the norm . . . can strike a person at the core of his being [,
especially] adolescent students.” 119 On that basis, one can distinguish reasonable
policies by school officials that suppress speech that, in a different context, would
be entitled to First Amendment protection.
D. Summary
In sum, this Part argues for an alternative to supplement the privileging of
judicial minimalism as a mechanism for enhancing cultural pluralism. A threepart set of interpretive devices—treating civil obedience as non-expressive,
allocating the burden of dissent from the message of antidiscrimination laws to
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those who object to those laws, and stringently protecting those rights to dissent—
will preserve dignity rights on both sides while better aligning with the goal of
achieving equality. These interpretive principles should form part of pluralist
jurisprudence.
V. CIVIL RIGHTS MORALISM
Because both sexuality and religious liberty are so morally charged, so
intrinsically infused with normative constructs, disputes in which the two sets of
rights are pitted against each other are especially revealing of fissures in the
meaning of antidiscrimination law. On one hand, this branch of law is treated as a
viewpoint-neutral regulatory mechanism for equalizing opportunity in economic
markets and civil society. On the other hand, more informally but with
comparable frequency, courts describe antidiscrimination law in openly
expressive and specifically moralistic terms. When antidiscrimination law covers
a form of stigmatized sexuality, the two cultural meanings of this type of law
clash, sometimes in rhetorically violent terms.
The idea of racial equality has become a core principle in the American
narrative of progress, embedded alongside the belief that whatever can be
correctly categorized as racist behavior is intrinsically morally wrong. The origins
of what I would call civil rights moralism are understandable, and even noble.
The civil rights movement for racial equality, especially as it emerged in
the South, steadfastly linked itself to a broadly envisioned concept of Christian
ethics, amplified by the prophetic traditions within African-American
Protestantism. Invoking “the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and God
Almighty” as a seamless conjoined authority created a powerful message for the
movement both externally and internally. 120 The gestalt of civil rights organizing
was “a part of the historical tradition of religious revivals as much as it [was] of
the tradition of protest movements.” 121
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Throughout the 1950s, movement leaders prioritized securing a
presidential imprimatur for an explicitly moral framing of the issue. 122 When
President Kennedy declared in 1963 that the question of integration forced the
nation to confront “a moral issue . . . [that] is as old as the Scriptures and . . . as
clear as the American Constitution,” movement leaders celebrated the speech as
an enormous breakthrough, not only in their public statements but in their private
communications as well. 123
Yet that framing leads directly to its own reaction.
Religious
conservatives argue that a sincere belief in the moral evil of homosexuality could
not possibly constitute a civil rights violation in a universe of meanings in which a
violation of civil rights is itself morally wrong. To the observant adherent of
traditionalist conservative Christianity or the other western faiths, both could not
be true. 124 The dilemma of civil rights moralism arises from disbelief that
condemnation of evil can encompass both the wrong of bigotry and the wrong of
homosexuality.
For some religious conservatives, the possibility that Bob Jones could be
applied in a LGBT equality context as the GRC panel did – to forbid a religious
institution from engaging in a practice that is core to its faith – leads the parade of
horribles to be feared from the acceptance of marriage equality. 125 The most
common rejoinder—that Bob Jones is an outlier decision unlikely to be applied
outside the context of race—fails to grapple with what a future court could
plausibly do. 126
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In the LGBT equality cases that have come before the Supreme Court,
Justice Scalia’s opinions epitomize both the morality-inflected arguments at issue
in these disputes and the emotional defensiveness that they trigger. The
foundational premise of his opinions is the refusal to accept the equivalence of
sexual orientation discrimination and race discrimination, reasoning that the latter
is properly aligned with bigotry, while the former represents healthy majoritarian
interpretations of morality.
In the first of a series of dissenting opinions in LGBT equality cases,
Justice Scalia nailed the point: whether “the proposition that opposition to
homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias” is “precisely the
cultural debate” that arises in disputes over LGBT equality laws. 127 He rejected
the majority’s ruling that a provision of the Colorado state constitution adopted by
voters reflected animus toward lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men, as if
“‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil” or “somehow un-American.” 128 In his
view, Colorado’s anti-gay law reflected merely a different form of morality, not
an inferior form. To Justice Scalia, support for a discriminatory law rested on the
time-honored belief that “homosexuality is morally wrong and socially harmful”
and on merit worthy efforts to defend “traditional American moral values” 129 and
“prevent piecemeal deterioration of majoritarian sexual morality.” 130
Justice Scalia’s dissent in United States v. Windsor 131 uses language even
more saturated with alarm over losing a claim to the moralist high ground. At
issue in Windsor was a constitutional challenge to the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which forbade the federal government from recognizing lawful samesex marriages. Scalia chastised the majority opinion for celebrating “how superior
the majority’s moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is to Congress’s
‘hateful’ moral judgment against it.” 132 He railed against the ways in which
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court found a “‘bare desire to harm’” or
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“malice” toward same-sex couples in DOMA’s legislative history. 133 The primary
thread of his dissent is that those who oppose homosexuality or marriage equality
are morally good persons holding morally legitimate views, and not the
caricatures he accused the majority of suggesting: “those with hateful hearts,”134
“unhinged monsters of a wild-eyed lynch mob,” 135 “enemies of the human
race” 136 and “of human decency,” 137 and, simply, “monsters.” 138 Justice Scalia
returned to what he had identified in Romer as the heart of a civil rights claim:
whether the law’s differential treatment was based on a morally unworthy
prejudice, equivalent to racial or religious bias.
Justice Scalia’s emotionalism and hyperbole may seem extreme, but he is
not alone. Some scholars have endorsed his interpretation. 139 These critics are on
target in recognizing that the j’accuse effect of antidiscrimination claims itself
constitutes a significant source of cultural power. Understandably, civil rights
advocates may resist any weakening of this significant cultural tool. But, just as it
is often difficult in the United States to disaggregate religious teachings from nonsectarian ethical values in the context of sex, it is challenging—but necessary—to
distinguish moralism from the social goods and norms embedded in the equality
principle.
Consistent with the principle that civil obedience must be interpreted as
neutrality under the law, courts faced with normative disputes in civil rights cases
should resist the temptation to engage in moralistic reasoning. Revisiting and
revising the cultural discourse of antidiscrimination law is important for at least
three reasons. First, to do so would lower the intensity of various cultural
divisions and thus contribute to a sense of social cohesion. Second, subtracting
133
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religious moralism from civil rights arguments would benefit those whose
equality claims are most likely to encounter resistance from traditional religious
spheres, especially women and sexual minorities. 140 Ironically, unless
antidiscrimination is viewed as more of a transactional mandate and less of a
moralistic command, it will continue its position as the legal glove that does not
fit for sex and gender claims. Lastly, the search for individual animus has
contributed to rendering antidiscrimination law as less useful for attacking
structural hierarchies rather than episodic bad actors. Substituting a robust
conceptualization of structural discrimination for the search for individual animus
would strengthen, rather than weaken, the ethical foundations of a commitment to
civil rights.
VI. PLURALISMS
Some disputes strain the capacity of law to produce reasoned conclusions.
There is a widespread belief that pluralism is the best response. When society is
sharply divided over what constitutes moral goods, the legal system ideally serves
to maintain social order and facilitate social integration, performing an essential
defensive function in the face of culture wars. Concepts of pluralism furnish the
lodestar for that effort. With that safety valve in place, modern liberal
democracies can encourage creative tension among the state, civil society and
religious institutions as generators of moral values and beliefs. The trick is to
maintain the magic mixture of competition and harmony, an equilibrium that will
protect minority views and values from destruction if not extinction.
The normative punch of pluralism lies in its ethical imperative to respect
competing viewpoints and to recognize that incompatible values may be held by
persons presumed by the law to be equally rational. The Religion Clauses
represent the response of the Framers to this tension: a prohibition on the state
from “sending a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” 141
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What pluralism is to governance, tolerance is to culture. Tolerance, many
believe, offers a repository of universal and neutral values that can be marshaled
as aids in the peaceful adjudication of competing moral claims. Law as its own
cultural realm has generated principles of adjudication that embody tolerance and
pluralism, chief among them the techniques of judicial restraint. The great appeal
of minimalism as a pluralism-driven technique for adjudication—of “leaving
things undecided” —is its facilitation of more time and cultural space for the
informal evolution of views on divisive questions.
Yet the shortcomings of pluralism and tolerance are also wellrehearsed. 142 While protecting a stigmatized minority from violence (either
juridical or physical), reliance on tolerance as an approach to social conflict
simultaneously reinforces the status quo of hierarchical power relationships. The
more powerful group need only tolerate the less powerful, and the latter group
must make do as best it can with something less than equality or redress. A
regime of tolerance acts as a kind of mandate for formal equality, but nothing
more, in the allocation of access to discursive space.
Judge Mack’s opinion in GRC exemplifies cultural tolerance and
pluralistic judging. Its genius was the defusing of two seemingly irreconcilable
conscience-based positions, framed as the conflict between equality and religious
expression. The court succeeded in enforcing the D.C. Human Rights Law while
simultaneously treating the claims of the two opposing norm-driven entities as
equally entitled to respect. In so doing, it successfully shifted the shape of the
dispute from narrow and deep to narrow and shallow, deploying a jurisprudence
of minimalism in the service of the politics of pluralism.
The decision has served well as a bridge from a time in which only a tiny
fraction of jurisdictions permitted an antidiscrimination claim based on sexual
orientation to the present. Its compromise resolution was useful in warding off
premature closure of a values debate that continues today, and it bought time for
public opinion to evolve. Following an initial period of backlash after the
decision, 143 Georgetown has become a leader among Catholic universities in its
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support of openly LGBT students. 144 It has established an LGBTQ Resource
Center on campus, where the annual award for an outstanding graduating law
student is named for the individual who led the plaintiff organization in GRC.145
Other Catholic universities have begun to provide similar services. 146
The GRC decision did not, however, produce constitutional clarity on the
critical and lingering question of whether the exclusion of certain persons can be
justified as necessary for an entity to communicate its own ideas and self-identity.
The singular nature of its resolution—the court’s split remedy distinguishing
between symbolic and material benefits—limited the precedential impact of the
decision. No court of last resort since has cited GRC as determinative.
This Part argues that “pluralism” is best understood as a question, not an
answer, in the equality versus religious expression debates. The meaning of
pluralism lies in the mind of the beholder. To say that fostering pluralism is the
wisest governance model for dealing with diametrically opposite, intensely held
beliefs only begs the question of which version of pluralism one supports.
I identify two models of pluralism relevant to the context of disputes
between equality rights and religious expression rights, distinguished by how each
would structure the role of the state. I argue that in a modern democracy, the state
must act as the umpire, not merely as a player, in its implementation of pluralist
principles. I close by identifying an example of nested pluralism that is hiding in
plain sight in the gay rights versus religious expression debate: the changing
content of religious beliefs.

from the public accommodations provision under which the Georgetown litigation was brought.
D.C. Code § 2-1402.41(3) (2014). See Walsh, supra note 25 at 564-65.
144
Kyle Spencer, A Rainbow Over Catholic Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2013, at ED22; Jenna
Johnson, Georgetown U. Tries to be Catholic and Gay-Friendly, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2009.
145
LA Gay and Lesbian Center, Graduating Georgetown Law Student Honored with First Lorri L
Jean Award for Excellence, May 9, 2012.
146
Cat Zakrzewski, Catholic Colleges Respond to Demand for LGBTQ Resources, USA TODAY,
Sept. 3, 2013, In another sign of change, in 2010, the Association of Jesuit Colleges and
Universities joined an amicus brief arguing that there was no First Amendment violation caused
by prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination at universities and by open access
requirements that all students be eligible to join all recognized student organizations. Brief for
Amici Curiae American Council on Education and Thirteen Other Higher Education
Organizations in Support of Respondents at 16–31, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 2010 WL
942821.

A. The State as Player
Beyond the most generic values associated with tolerance, pluralism itself
is a contested concept. The decision in GRC, for example, has been both
celebrated and condemned in the name of pluralism. 147 Such conflicting reactions,
claiming the same rationale for opposite conclusions, flow from the fact that
pluralism—perhaps because of its “mother and apple pie” appeal in a society that
craves less political polarization—has been appropriated to mean two very
different systems.
Consider the Biblical injunction to “render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.” 148 One can read that simple
sentence as implying a sequence or priority: one’s obligations as a citizen come
first and loom largest, but always with the reservation of core conscience-driven
duties toward a deity. Or, it can be read as two equivalent commands.
Proponents of the widest scope of Free Exercise protections endorse the
second reading. Under this model of pluralism, the state is one contestant among
many, proffering one claim among many as a source of moral authority. Like any
interest group, the state constitutes one faction, and must itself operate under a
rule of mutual tolerance.
Michael McConnell is the leading scholar and advocate of what he calls
“the new American philosophy of religious pluralism.” 149 His work best
exemplifies this privatist claim to pluralism: the argument that citizens owe no
more to Caesar than to God, indeed probably a great deal less:
At its very core, the Free Exercise Clause . . .
reflected a theological position: that God is
sovereign. It also reflected a political theory: that
government is a subordinate association . . . To
recognize the sovereignty of God is to recognize a
plurality of authorities and to impress upon
147

See, e.g., Eskridge and Peller, supra note 4; Eskridge, supra note 4; Walsh, supra note 25, at
561.
148
Matthew 22:21.
149
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1513 (1990).

government the need for humility and restraint . . .
[T]he government has an obligation to defer, where
possible, to the dictates of religious conscience . .
. 150
Another related component of the state-as-player model is an understanding that
religious commandments are equivalent to secular laws: “The Free Exercise
Clause does not protect autonomy; it protects obligation…The Free Exercise
Clause does not protect the freedom of self-determination . . . ; it does protect the
freedom to act in accordance with the dictates of religion, as the believer
understands them.” 151
On this understanding, God is sovereign, the individual is a subject of
God, and the state poses a dangerous threat to the individual’s ability to carry out
her religious duties. A “pluralistic republic” exists when “citizens are free to
exercise their religious differences without hindrance from the state.” 152 The
“pluralistic philosophy of the Religion Clauses” mandates that “the state must
create exceptions to laws of general applicability when these laws threaten the
religious convictions or practices of religious institutions or individuals.”153
Institutions of state power—such as courts and legislatures—should create carveouts that can sustain the principle of equal moral authority on as many political
and social issues as possible.
To adherents of the state-as-player model, the remedy that Georgetown
won in GRC—merely the discretion to withhold what could be perceived as
endorsement of the gay student group—constituted a defeat for religious
autonomy. Indeed, this particular resolution of the case had been acceptable to the
plaintiffs from the beginning of the lawsuit. 154 Moreover, the role of the state—
with its compelling interest in eliminating sexual orientation discrimination—
occupied too much normative space.
150
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If the state is merely one contestant, it then makes perfect sense that
antidiscrimination laws that make sexual orientation a protected characteristic
would themselves amount to discrimination. Their enforcement creates a burden
that has a disparate impact on religious entities that oppose equal treatment based
on sexual orientation. This, then, is the pluralist attack on the GRC court’s
pluralism.
B. The State as Umpire
The second model of pluralism casts the state as umpire, the incontestable
and final source of authority in a constitutional democracy. Protection for
religious freedom flows from the mandate on the state to remain neutral as
between religions and between religion and non-religion. Debates over what
constitutes genuine neutrality center on the scope of the Establishment Clause: if
the neutrality principle forces the government to dispense aid, for example, to
religious institutions to the same extent as to sectarian institutions, it then runs up
against the principle forbidding the advancement of and entanglement with
religion. 155
There is some truth to the criticism that in state-as-umpire pluralism, the
implicit foundation is that of secular dominance, since the state is a secular force.
Benjamin Berger has characterized the conflict between law and religion as a
cross-cultural encounter, and argued “law always vindicates its own cultural
understandings.” 156 Ultimately, any tolerance is by the state, of religion. For the
state-as-umpire model, this reality is not only inevitable, but appropriate. The
process of weighing and then comparing the level of harm to different groups
from a particular policy, after all, requires someone to determine and enforce the
result.
This second model, with which I agree, is grounded in the belief that
achieving any common ground in a cosmopolitan modern state requires a “secular
public moral order.” 157 Pluralist democracy, as William Eskridge has noted, is
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fragile both because its viability is contingent on agreement among diverse and
adversarial groups to abide by the processes of law and because the number of
identity groups—and thus the level of intensity of inter-group conflict—is
constantly increasing. 158
Where the first model of pluralism would privilege private individual
practices and understandings, the state-as-umpire second model is intrinsically
committed to a public culture of much broader scope. It shrinks the space for
carve-outs from generally applicable laws to that which captures infringements
that are not justifiable because of the disproportionality of the harm that they
impose as compared to the benefit that accrues from universal enforcement.
Certainly Bob Jones would have been decided differently had the first model of
pluralism been the Court’s operative philosophy.
In addition, situations such as that in GRC when an accommodationist
exemption would deny rights or benefits to a third party require a state-as-umpire
model in order to protect the status and material well-being of non-adherents.
State-as-player model pluralism, however, is on the offensive, at least in
the Supreme Court. The Court’s recent opinions concerning the scope of the
ministerial exception to antidiscrimination liability159 and the viability of a RFRA
claim by some for-profit corporations 160 hint of an opening for the first model in
its language suggesting autonomy from generally applicable laws for religious
entities, although the holding was explicitly cabined to the facts of that case.
Insofar as the issue of LGBT rights is concerned, these two models are well
underway on a collision course that began with the decision in GRC.
C. We Are All Pluralists Now
What does the future hold? The LGBT equality versus religious liberty
conflict will, increasingly likely, become one of the primary sites in which broad
understandings of pluralism will be negotiated. As iterative resolutions of this
conflict emerge, there will be recalibration of which sexual and religious norms
are socially legible as majoritarian or dissenting, and which conceptions of
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morality will acquire greater or lesser cultural power. The role of religion in
regulating sexuality has long been so central to its social function that the
prospect of that role diminishing calls into question the defining aspects of
religious authority in the United States.
With public opinion rapidly shifting on the acceptability of marriage
equality and other areas of LGBT equality, it is a safe bet that the social meaning
of homosexuality will continue to change. But these will not be the only beliefs
that will change. Religious beliefs are also social constructions, which themselves
change and will continue to do so. 161 It is a mistake to see public opinion
regarding sexuality as the variable with religious belief as a constant. In fact, both
are in motion.
VII. CONCLUSION
In GRC, the D.C. Court of Appeals understood that its role was not to pick
one moral vision over another, but to divide a realm of expressive space.
Although the court declared that one side won the battle of symbols and the other
side won the battle of material benefits, the question was always whether both
would be forced to co-exist in the particular community of meanings that was
Georgetown University. The ruling forced that co-existence, which was its
greatest achievement.
In this article, I have probed the weaknesses of the decision and used my
analysis as the platform for proposing changes enabling courts to better adjudicate
disputes that arise at the point of conflict between LGBT equality claims and
defenses based on religious expression. I have opposed those who seek a general
right of exemption from antidiscrimination laws, but also suggested methods that
will enhance the protections for dissent by those who oppose such laws. As these
questions continue to arise, which they will, there are many lessons to be learned
from the Georgetown case.
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